I. International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) is the principal permanent judicial organ of the United Nations. 2 It has jurisdiction to decide disputes submitted to it by states parties and to render advisory opinions requested by certain U.N. organs. 3 The list of cases currently pending before the ICJ may be found on the ICJ's website. 4 This section briefly outlines the contentious cases decided by the Court and lists the composition of the Court.
A. CONTENTIOUS CASES
During the period under review, the ICJ delivered four judgments and an advisory opinion, which are summarized below. Details on the two orders delivered in 2012 can be found on the ICJ's website. 5 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)
On November 19, 2012, the ICJ delivered a judgment in a dispute raised by Nicaragua against Colombia concerning title to island territory and maritime delimitation. 6 In its application to the Court on December 6, 2001, Nicaragua claimed sovereignty over several islands and other maritime features in the San Andrés Archipelago and sought a determination on the maritime delimitation between itself and Colombia. 7 On December 13, 2007, the ICJ issued a decision with respect to Preliminary Objections in which it found that Colombia had sovereignty over three islands: San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. 8 In its latest judgment, the Court concluded that Colombia has sovereignty over the remaining islands still in dispute. 9 Because neither party could establish title by virtue of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, the Court found that Colombia had established title to the disputed territory by way of consistently acting à titre de souverain. The Court also concluded that each island would have a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea envelope and that the delimitation of the continental shelf would extend 200 nautical miles due east from designated points on the baselines of each territorial sea delimitation. 10 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)
On July 20, 2012, the ICJ delivered a judgment in a dispute raised by Belgium regarding Senegal's failure to prosecute the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré. 11 In its application to the ICJ on February 19, 2009, Belgium complained that Senegal had violated its obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and customary international law for failing to prosecute or extradite the former president for "crimes of torture and crimes against humanity." 12 The Court concluded that Senegal had violated its obligations under the Convention after Belgium requested extradition because Senegal had failed to prosecute or extradite Habré within a reasonable time and "without delay. VOL. 47
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The Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to decide Belgium's claims under customary international law because at the time of the application there was no dispute between the parties regarding Senegal's obligations under customary international law. 14 Nonetheless, the Court unanimously concluded that it had jurisdiction under the Convention. 15 One of the deciding reasons for this was because the Court recognized that all parties could enforce obligations under the Convention. 16 This case marks the first time the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over a dispute between parties to the Convention against Torture and one of the rare occasions in which the court decided obligations established by international human rights treaties. On June 19, 2012, the ICJ delivered a judgment granting compensation in a diplomatic protection claim raised by Guinea against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the DRC). 18 In its application to the ICJ on December 28, 1998, Guinea asserted that the DRC had unlawfully imprisoned its citizen, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, and seized "his sizable investments, businesses, movable and immovable property and bank accounts." 19 In a November 30, 2010 judgment on the merits, the Court concluded that the DRC had violated its obligations under Articles 9 and 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 6 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights. 20 The Court gave the parties six months to come to an agreement on the question of compensation. 21 Failing agreement on the question of compensation, the Court awarded Guinea damages of $95,000 in its judgment this year as compensation for personal and property injuries arising from the unlawful detention and expulsion of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. On February 3, 2012, the ICJ delivered a judgment finding that Italy violated Germany's right to jurisdictional immunity. 23 In an application to the ICJ on December 23, 2008, Germany complained that Italy had violated customary international law by allowing civil proceedings to be brought against it by Italian victims of Nazi persecution. 24 Italy first argued that customary international law had developed to the point that state immunity should not extend to Germany for "acts occasioning death, personal injury or damage to property" on its territory even if the acts in question were performed jure imperii. 25 Italy also argued that immunity was appropriately denied when Germany had committed serious violations under international law. 26 The Court concluded that a state is entitled to jurisdictional immunity under customary international law even if the conduct that gave rise to the claim was unlawful. On February 1, 2012, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in a dispute raised by the Executive Board of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD or Fund), finding that a judgment given in an employment case by the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (the Tribunal) was valid. 28 Saez García served as a program officer at Global Mechanism at IFAD until she was let go due to a reduction in the budget. 29 After a challenge to the decision failed before the Joint Appeal's Board of the Fund, Ms. Garcia filed a complaint with the Tribunal. 30 In its judgment on February 3, 2010, the Tribunal ordered the Fund to reinstate Ms. Garcia and awarded her a payment of lost salaries, allowances, and entitlements. 31 The Executive Board of the Fund requested the Court for an advisory opinion on the validity of the April 22, 2010. 32 The Court concluded that the Tribunal was competent ratione personae to consider the complaint brought by Saez García against the Fund because (1) she was an official of the Fund, an international organization that recognizes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; and 35 The PCA's Secretariat, the International Bureau, headed by its Secretary-General, offers registry services and administrative and legal support to ad hoc tribunals and commissions. As of November 29, 2012, twenty-four new cases were added to the PCA's docket in 2012. 36 As of March 2, 2013, the PCA served as a registry in seventy pending registry cases; thirty-eight were investor-State disputes, twenty-seven were brought under contracts of which one party is a State, State entity, or inter-governmental organization, and five were inter-State arbitrations. 37 Inter-State arbitrations currently before the PCA (1996) . 41 The rules under revision were based on the 1976 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, and one of the tasks of the Drafting Committee, by Professor Jan Paulsson, would be to take into account the 2010 revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 42 The new procedural rules, merging these rules into a single set of procedural rules, were adopted on December 17, 2012. 43 
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDUS WATERS KISHENGANGA ARBITRATION
The 2011 Year in Review reported on the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, an inter-State arbitration between Pakistan and India. 44 In particular, we described the Court of Arbitration's weeklong site visit to the Neelum-Jhelum and Kishenganga hydroelectric projects and surrounding areas, which took place in June 2011. 45 Such site visits by interstate arbitral tribunals are very rare. 46 On February 4, 2012, the Court of Arbitration made a second one-day site visit to the Neelum River Valley. 47 On August 31, 2012, the Court of Arbitration concluded a two-week hearing on the merits. 48 The majority of arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the PCA are confidential, and awards rendered in these proceedings are not publicly available.
In ICS Inspection and Control Services Ltd. v. Argentina, the PCA Tribunal (Tribunal) declined jurisdiction over the dispute on the grounds that the claimant had not observed a provision in the U.K. -Argentina bilateral investment treaty (BIT), stipulating that the investor litigate the dispute for eighteen months in Argentinean courts before initiating international arbitration. 50 Citing the Wintershall v. Argentina award, where the arbitrators came to the same conclusion, the Tribunal held that such a requirement was mandatory and amounted to more than a "mere waiting period." 51 This outcome is similar to the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which earlier this year set aside the award in the case of BG v Argentina, citing the same requirement in the BIT in question. 52 The Tribunal also refused to import a dispute resolution provision that did not contain such a litigation requirement from another BIT concluded by Argentina via the Most-Favored Nation provision of the U.K. -Argentina BIT, thus departing from the approach taken in Maffezini v. Spain. 53 In Chevron v. Ecuador, the Tribunal rendered an interim award on jurisdiction and admissibility, in which it upheld its jurisdiction. 54 Of interest is the Tribunal's obiter dictum discussion of the fork-in-the-road provision in the United States -Ecuador BIT. 55 The Tribunal rejected Ecuador's argument that Ecuadorian court litigation involving the claimants precluded the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the fork-in-the-road clause notwithstanding, because private parties not participating in the treaty arbitration initiated these local proceedings against the claimants in Ecuadorean courts. 56 But the Tribunal criticized the "triple identity" test prevalent in investment treaty jurisprudence, whereby, in order to trigger the application of the fork-in-the-road clause, identity of the parties, object, and cause of action was required. 57 
III. The International Criminal Court
In 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC) marked the first decade of its existence. 59 It saw Fatou Bensouda become the head of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), when the term of Luis Moreno Ocampo concluded. 60 The OTP conducted investigations in seven countries: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Darfur region of Sudan, the Republic of Kenya, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Côte d'Ivoire; and conducted preliminary examinations in eight additional countries: Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea, Nigeria and Mali. 61 In 2012, the government of Mali referred the situation since January 2012 in Mali. 62 The ICC also issued its first judgment, in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. 63 A. JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND REPARATIONS IN THE LUBANGA CASE On March 14, 2012, Trial Chamber I (Trial Chamber) delivered its Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, finding Thomas Lubanga Dyilo guilty, as a co-perpetrator, of the charges of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) and using them to actively participate in hostilities within the meaning of Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. 64 The Court determined that the violations took place in the context of a noninternational armed conflict in the Ituri region during a period beginning in early September 2002 and running through August 13, 2003. 65 The Trial Chamber issued a unanimous decision of guilt, applying the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt." 66 Judges Fulford and Odio Bonito authored separate and dissenting opinions, respectively. Judge Fulford took issue with the test laid down by the Pre-Trial Chamber in regards to whether an individual has committed a crime "jointly with another" pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. 67 Judge Odio Benito also criticized the majority as to the evidentiary value accorded to certain video footage introduced as evidence. 69 Finally, Judge Odio Benito disagreed with the majority as to the legal definitions of the crimes of enlistment, conscription, and use of children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in hostilities-particularly the elements of "national armed forces" and "to participate actively in hostilities," 70 criticizing the chamber's decision not to proffer a definition of "to participate actively in hostilities" and arguing that sexual violence should be included within the legal concept of "to participate actively in hostilities." 71 On July 10, 2012, the Trial Chamber issued its Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, sentencing Lubanga to fourteen years imprisonment. 72 The Trial Chamber applied Articles 23, 76, 77, 78, and 81(2)(a) of the Rome Statute and Rules 143, 145, and 146 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 73 The Trial Chamber held that in determining the sentence, they were entitled to consider sexual violence committed against the children associated with the FPLC-despite the Prosecutor's decision not to charge Lubanga with rape or other forms of sexual violence. 74 The majority, however, found that, based on the totality of evidence provided, they were "unable to conclude that sexual violence against children who were recruited was sufficiently widespread that it could be characteri[z]ed as occurring in the ordinary course of the implementation of the common plan for which Mr. Lubanga [was] responsible." 75 Judge Odio Benito issued a dissenting opinion in which she argued for a joint sentence of fifteen years (pursuant to Article 78(3) of the Rome Statute), based separately on conscription of children under fifteen, enlisting children under the age of fifteen, and using children to participate actively in hostilities. 76 On August 7, 2012, the Trial Chamber issued its Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations in the Lubanga case. 77 The Trial Chamber, acting pursuant to Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute, established principles of reparations related to restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation. 78 In 2009, Ali Khashan, acting as Minister of Justice of the Government of Palestine, lodged a declaration with the ICC accepting its exercise of jurisdiction over "acts committed on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002." 80 On April 3, 2012, the OTP released a statement explaining that the "preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction" were absent, thus precluding a formal investigation. 81 The OTP noted that the status of Palestine before the U.N. General Assembly was that of "observer," rather than "non-member State." 82 The question may be revisited; however, as the U.N. General Assembly granted Palestine "non-member observer status" in November 2012. 83 In its statement, the OTP focused on the status of Palestine, explaining the requisite of statehood for the Court's jurisdiction. 84 It pointed to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, stating that it provides the basis for a state to confer jurisdiction on the Court, either by becoming a party to the Rome Statute 85 or by making an ad hoc declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction. 86 Thus, when considering the declaration of Palestine, the question arises as to who may properly determine whether Palestine is a state for the purpose of ICC jurisdiction under Article 12. The OTP determined that this competence lies first with the U.N. Secretary-General, "who, in the case of doubt, will defer to the guidance of the General Assembly. Karadžić, a former president of the Republika Srpska, is charged with eleven counts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Prosecution ended the presentation of its case on May 25. 93 On June 11 and 13, the trial chamber held a hearing pursuant to Rule 98 bis 94 to determine whether the charges should proceed to the defense phase. 95 On June 28, the trial chamber issued its finding stating that the prosecution met the burden of providing evidence capable of supporting a conviction on ten charges and dismissed one count of genocide that was committed in 1992 against Bosnian Muslims and Croats in several municipalities. 96 The trial chamber found that the totality of the evidence presented with respect to the charge of genocide, i.e. "the killing of, serious bodily or mental harm to, the forcible displacement of, and conditions of life inflicted" calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, "did not reach the level from which a reasonable tier of fact could infer that genocide occurred in the municipalities" in 1992. 97 Both parties are appealing the trial chamber's decision, with the Prosecution alleging that the charge of genocide in the municipalities was dismissed in error, and Karadžić arguing that the chamber erred when it upheld the charge of taking U.N. personnel hostage. 98 The trial of Ratko Mladić, a former General of the Bosnian Serb Army, began on May 16, 2012. 99 During the opening statements, the Prosecution mapped out the charges against the accused, which include a charge of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
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violation of the laws and customs of war. 100 He is accused of committing these crimes both in an individual criminal capacity and in concert with others through participation in a joint criminal enterprise. 101 The trial was delayed by a few weeks due to the Prosecution's failure to disclose several thousand possible exhibits to the Defense. 102 The trial chamber, concerned with the impact on the fairness of the trial if the Defense does not have adequate time to review the evidence and to prepare for the Trial, decided that the appropriate remedy to ensure the fair trial is to postpone the trial until June 25. 103 Karadžić and Mladić, along with Slobodan Milošević, 104 are the most high profile criminals put on trial, and the trials are watched by victims to see if the individuals who have evaded the Tribunal for years will finally be found criminally responsible for the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
B. THE LAST CASE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL-GORAN HADŽIĆ
The ICTY started its final trial on October 16, against Goran Hadžić, who was the Tribunal's last fugitive captured on July 20, 2011. 105 The Prosecution charged Hadžić with crimes against humanity and war crimes, under individual criminal responsibility and participation in a joint criminal enterprise with an aim to permanently remove the nonSerbian population from a large territory of the Republic of Croatia. 106 The indictment contends that Hadžić, who was the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, was in a position to formulate and assist in carrying out the objectives of the joint criminal enterprise. 108 While the Trial Chamber deliberated the case, Š ešelj was also on trial for contempt of the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 77(A) and A(ii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for failing to remove documents revealing confidential information about protected witnesses on his website. 109 Under Rule 77(A), the Prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused had the requisite actus reus and mens rea. The trial chamber found that the accused, who is the sole owner of the website and decides what appears on the website, was in a position to take positive action to remove the disclosed material but failed to remove the material. 110 The trial chamber also found that the accused had the required mens rea as he received previous court decisions to remove confidential material, and the accused explicitly stated that he would not comply with the court's order. 111 The trial chamber found Š ešelj guilty and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. 112
D. PROSECUTOR V. HARADINAJ-PROSECUTION OF CRIMES IN KOSOVO
In Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, the appeals chamber ordered a partial retrial to allow the Prosecution additional time to exhaust all reasonable steps to secure testimony of two crucial witnesses, a request that was previously denied by the trial chamber. 113 Haradinaj, a commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army, was charged with violation of the laws or customs of war in Kosovo in 1998, which were carried out against Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. 114 The appeal chamber reasoned that the trial chamber violated the Prosecution's right to a fair trial when it failed to allot additional time, beyond the 125 hours that were allotted at the beginning of the case, and thus prevented the Prosecution from securing testimony from two crucial witnesses who were afraid to testify due to witness intimidation. 115 The re-trial commenced in August 2011, and the chamber is expected to issue the verdict before the end of 2012. In Gotovina et al., the trial chamber found the Croatian Generals, Gotovina and Markač, guilty of crimes committed against the Serbian population during Operation Storm in the fall of 1995. 116 The trial chamber found that Gotovina conspired with others to permanently remove the Serbian population from the Krajina region and sought to achieve this objective by force, forcible removal, and murders. On November 16, the appeals chamber acquitted and ordered the immediate release of Gotovina and Markač after the majority of judges found that the trial chamber erred in concluding that artillery impact sites farther than 200 meters from the legitimate targets were evidence of unlawful attacks against towns during Operation Storm. 117 
F. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESIDUAL MECHANISMS
Perhaps the most significant development with respect to the ICTY was the startup of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) on July 1, 2012. 118 The Security Council has established the MICT to combine the remaining cases requiring resolution from the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as part of the completion strategy for these two Tribunals. 119 The Hague branch is scheduled to begin operations on July 1, 2013, with the mandate to continue the Tribunal's efforts to bring justice and prosecute the most responsible individuals for atrocities committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslav Republic in the 1990s. 120
V. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law, and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone, starting in 1996. In all, the Prosecutor indicted thirteen individuals, including Liberian President Charles Taylor. 121 The trial chamber's judgment in Taylor's case and the current appeal likely represent the fulfillment of the court's original mandate.
A. PROSECUTOR V. CHARLES TAYLOR JUDGMENT
In its judgment, signed by Justices Richard Lussick, Teresa Doherty, and Julia Sebutinde, the trial chamber convicted Taylor of aiding and abetting the commission by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including sexual slavery, murder, child soldier conscription, rape, pillaging, and other crimes. 122 The Prosecutor alleged that Taylor participated in a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) designed to "forcibly control the population and territory of Sierra Leone and to pillage its resources, in particular diamonds," 124 which the Defense disputed. 125 The chamber found that while Taylor provided significant operational and military support to the Revolutionary Forces inside of Sierra Leone, the prosecution failed to prove Taylor contributed significantly to the JCE. 126 Instead, the chamber saw Taylor's relationship with the RUF as "mutually beneficial" and built on "converging and synergistic interests" that evolved over time, not as a JCE. 127 Despite its JCE finding, the chamber found Taylor aided and abetted the numerous atrocities committed against the civilian population by the RUF/AFRC as part of an explicit operational strategy 128 designed to achieve military gains, to attract international attention, and to improve negotiating stance. 129 Taylor, as President of Liberia, was aware of the RUF/AFRC atrocities through intelligence briefings, reports from international organizations, and news reports. 130 Despite this knowledge, Taylor provided arms and ammunition, moral support and encouragement, military personnel, and operational support to these groups. 131 Taylor's knowledge of the RUF/AFRC's stated goal of spreading terror in the civilian population through rape, murder, sexual slavery, forced labor, and other forms of violence and acts of terror, combined with his active support of these operations, made Taylor criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of the RUF/AFRC's crimes.
Taylor's conviction for the planning of RUF/AFRC activities stemmed from atrocities committed during the 1998-1999 invasion of Freetown, Sierra Leone. Taylor met with RUF/AFRC leaders, telling them to make their operations "fearful" to pressure the Sierra Leonean government to negotiate and to use "all means" to capture Freetown. 132 Taylor laid the foundation of the invasion plan, was often updated on the invasion's progress, and was aware of the brutal and illegal tactics of the fighters.
The chamber determined that Taylor's plan substantially contributed to the attacks and the crimes, meeting the actus reus element. 133 The chamber noted that Taylor's awareness of the RUF/AFRC's prior tactics and of the "substantial likelihood" that crimes would be committed during the plan's execution plan proved the planning crime's mental elements. 134 124. Id. ¶ 6893. 125. The common purpose of the enterprise changed during the trial; it was initially argued by the Prosecution -including up through an early appeal -that the JCE's purpose was to terrorize the public of Sierra Leone. Taylor's control over the activities of the RUF/AFRC was also examined. While the chamber did not judge whether Taylor instigated the crimes, which it found was a moot point given his aiding and abetting conviction, it discussed whether Taylor had ordered the criminal actions or was responsible under the doctrine of superior responsibility. 135 While Taylor held authority positions in the RUF/AFRC, instructions and guidance he gave to the RUF/AFRC were generally advisory and were not always followed. As a result, the chamber found that he was not responsible for ordering the commission of crimes. 136 On the issue of superior responsibility, the chamber found that though Taylor wielded substantial influence over the leaders of the RUF/AFRC, 137 he did not have effective control over them, namely that he did not have the material ability to prevent or punish the commission of the offenses. 138 Based on the relationships between Taylor and RUF/ AFRC leaders, the justices found that the RUF/AFRC military commanders were not Taylor's subordinates and did not feel obligated to follow Taylor's commands. 139 The Prosecutor also failed to prove that Liberian troops sent into Sierra Leone by Taylor were still subject to his command once across the border. 140 Given these facts, the trial chamber found that Taylor was not criminally responsible under the doctrine of superior responsibility. 141 The trial chamber sentenced Taylor to fifty years of detention, a sentence that both the Defense and the Prosecution have appealed. 142 The prosecution is asking for an eightyyear sentence on appeal, regardless of how the appeals chamber rules on its other arguments. 143 Additionally, the Prosecutor is asking the appeals chamber to find that Taylor ordered and instigated the crimes and to find culpability for crimes in certain geographic areas that were excluded as outside the indictment. 144 The final appeals judgment is expected in September 2013. 145 
B. MOVE TO THE RESIDUAL MECHANISM
Following the appeals chamber's judgment in the Taylor's case, the SCSL's mandate will end. 146 The court's responsibilities will shift to a residual mechanism to provide for 135 147 This mechanism, The Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL), is governed by an agreement with Sierra Leone that was ratified in December 2011. 148 The RSCSL is responsible for: administering the court's archives, providing for witness and victim protection and support, evaluating requests for access to evidence and for compensation claims by national authorities, supervising sentence enforcement, reviewing convictions and acquittals, conducting contempt of court proceedings, providing defense counsel and legal aid any proceedings, and preventing double jeopardy. 149 The RSCSL will not have an active trial chamber, though the RSCSL President can constitute a trial chamber as needed for necessary proceedings. 150 Should the remaining fugitive, Johnny Paul Koroma, be captured, the RSCSL may try him. 151 
